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Since statehood, Alaska’s Constitution has included the right of the people to 
enact legislative change by direct democracy. The state’s initiative process as 
governed by the Alaska Constitution, statutes, and caselaw reflects a delicate 
balance of citizen participation within carefully crafted guardrails meant to 
ensure the efficacy of the process and the role of the legislature. Alaska courts 
have developed a still-evolving body of caselaw interpreting the restrictions on 
the subject and scope of ballot initiatives, the role of the executive and judicial 
branches in the initiative process, and the timing and procedural features of the 
process. Navigating the initiative process can be expensive and arduous, and 
can involve difficult legal judgments by the courts, the petitioners, and the 
executive branch. For decades Alaskans have managed to do just that, and 
direct democracy has proved to be an important tool for advancing the people’s 
interests when they fail to garner attention or support in the legislature. This 
piece reviews the history of direct democracy in the Alaska Constitution and 
the law on Alaska’s ballot initiative process as it currently stands, including 
important recent updates. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Alaska is one of twenty-one states that permits some form of direct 
democracy through ballot initiative, allowing citizens to propose and 
enact laws at elections as an alternative to legislative enactments.1 Since 
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statehood, over fifty initiative measures have been presented to Alaskan 
voters,2 with many more that ultimately failed to reach the ballot for 
various reasons.3 Because initiatives often deal with controversial 
subjects, they are frequently litigated. The Alaska Supreme Court (the 
Court) has developed a vast body of caselaw in this area that helps guide 
election law practitioners and initiative sponsors. The ballot initiative has 
proven an effective—if at times cumbersome and costly—means for 
Alaskans to enact laws when their elected officials have been unable or 
unwilling to do so through the regular legislative process. 
This Article explores and explains Alaska’s ballot initiative in four 
parts. Part II describes the constitutional origins of Alaska’s ballot 
initiative process. Part III delves into the constitutional requirements and 
restrictions governing the ballot initiative and the Court’s long line of 
caselaw interpreting those requirements and restrictions. Part IV explains 
various standards employed by the judiciary and rights preserved to the 
legislature when confronting ballot measures. Finally, Part V walks 
through the statutory process for proposing and enacting statewide ballot 
measures. The Article concludes that although Alaska’s ballot measure 
process can be daunting, difficult, and costly for ballot measure 
petitioners or sponsors, it is largely effective at preserving Alaskans’ right 
to direct democracy, which the authors of the Alaska Constitution 
believed was one of the people’s fundamental rights.4 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE BALLOT INITIATIVE IN 
ALASKA 
A.  The Delegates’ Vision of the Ballot Initiative and Historical 
Context 
On November 8, 1955, three years before statehood, fifty-five 
delegates to the Alaska Constitutional Convention gathered at the  
University of Alaska in Fairbanks to draft the Alaska Constitution.5 
 
initiative-states.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2020) (listing states with initiative or 
referendum processes). For purposes of this Article, the terms “ballot measure,” 
“measure,” “ballot initiative,” and “initiative” are used interchangeably. 
 2.  See Initiative History, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS 1–3 (June 24, 
2019) http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H26.pdf#page=1 
(cataloguing the history of initiatives that have appeared on ballots in Alaska). 
 3.  See id. at 4–13 (cataloguing initiatives that were successfully proposed but 
did not appear on the ballot, as well as initiatives that were denied or withdrawn). 
 4.  The last comprehensive treatment of the Alaskan ballot measure process 
in legal scholarship was authored in 1992. M. Katheryn Bradley & Deborah L. 
Williams, “Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Alaska . . .”—A Practitioner’s 
Guide to Alaska’s Initiative Law, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 279 (1992). 
 5.  Constitutional Convention, U. OF ALASKA (June 15, 2009, 10:40 AM), 
https://www.alaska.edu/creatingalaska/constitutional-convention/. 
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During this nearly month-long endeavor, the delegates devoted 
significant time to the ballot initiative.6 The delegates formed a committee 
to examine this form of direct legislation.7 The Committee described the 
process as “the power of the people to initiate laws themselves”—in other 
words, direct democracy—and that portion of the Alaska Constitution as 
“reserv[ing] the authority of the people to initiate laws by petition and 
vote of the people directly.”8 
The delegates believed that “[t]he exercise of the initiative is a 
fundamental right of the people.”9 In adopting what ultimately came to 
be article XI of the Alaska Constitution, the delegates “went into the 
historical background of the initiative” in the nineteen other states that 
then used it.10 They tried to strike a careful balance between three 
concerns: (1) permitting direct democracy in a way that was easy for the 
public to use and understand;11 (2) preserving legislative power by 
imposing certain restrictions on use of the initiative and giving the 
legislature the opportunity to enact a version of any given initiative;12 and 
(3) relieving the judiciary of adjudicating clearly unlawful measures.13 
 
 6.  See, e.g., 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 928–
84 (Dec. 16, 1955) [hereinafter PACC] (discussing proposed constitutional 
provision on initiatives). 
 7.  See 1 PACC 70 (Nov. 10, 1955) (statement of Del. Burke Riley) (proposing 
the “Committee on Direct Legislation, Amendment and Revision”). This Article 
focuses almost solely on the initiative process; it does not attempt to 
comprehensively address either recall or referendum. The referendum is the 
mechanism for voters to approve or reject acts of the legislature, as opposed to 
proactively enacting their own laws through initiative. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, 
§ 1 (“The people may propose and enact laws by the initiative, and approve or 
reject acts of the legislature by the referendum.”). 
 8.  2 PACC 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 931 (statement of Del. Warren A. Taylor). South Dakota was the first 
state to adopt the initiative process in 1898. State-by-State List of Initiative and 
Referendum Provisions, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states.cfm (last visited Sept. 8, 2020). Prior to 
1955, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington had also adopted the 
initiative process. Id. 
 11.  See 2 PACC 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins) (“The 
procedure outlined has the advantage of brevity while insuring the substantive 
rights to the people.”). 
 12.  See id. (“If the legislature adopts a measure that is the subject of the 
initiative, the measure does not have to be submitted to the people.”). 
 13.  See id. (“To prevent waste of money on elections for laws that are 
unconstitutional, sponsors are required to submit a proposed law to the Attorney 
General for certification of its constitutionality . . . . [This] provision is intended to 
stop, at the initial stage, the circulation of petitions for laws that would . . . result 
in expensive court action.”). 
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The delegates knew that direct democracy was not universal to the states, 
and that there was “some difference of opinion” both among the delegates 
and around the country “as to whether or not the principle of the 
initiative . . . [was] a desirable and necessary one.”14 They observed that 
Alaska had “very little [direct democracy] under our Territorial setup, 
such as they have had in the states.”15 But the Committee ultimately 
considered the initiative a “useful and desirable” addition to the Alaska 
Constitution, with “certain safeguards.”16 
In practice, unlike many other states whose constitutions 
“contain[ed] a great degree of detail relating to the exercise of the 
initiative,” the delegates wanted the legislature to “provide . . . some 
details” of the initiative process while not “restrict[ing] the substantive 
rights” of direct democracy, “nor to requir[ing] procedures more 
difficult” than those enshrined in the Alaska Constitution.17 They 
endorsed the legislature enacting “additional details of procedure” 
(subject to constitutional limitations), but intended the constitutional 
provision to have “the advantage of brevity while insuring the 
substantive rights of the people.”18 They wanted the law-making power 
of the people to be generally commensurate to that of the legislature.19 
Article XII, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution specifically provides that 
“[u]nless clearly inapplicable, the law-making powers assigned to the 
legislature may be exercised by the people through initiative, subject to 
the limitations of Article XI.”20 
The delegates also wanted to give the legislature a chance to enact 
its own version of whatever initiative the people were proposing, in order 
to safeguard the legislature’s role as the lawmaking body, stating: “If the 
legislature adopts a measure that is the subject of the initiative, the 
measure does not have to be submitted to the people.”21 The delegates did 
not want the public—or the courts—to waste their time on ballot 
measures that were plainly illegal. The Committee envisioned that “[t]o 
prevent waste of money on elections for laws that are unconstitutional,” 
sponsors would be “required to submit a proposed law to the Attorney 
 
 14.  Id. at 931 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. Victor C. Rivers). 
 15.  Id. at 800 (Dec. 13, 1955) (statement of Del. Irwin L. Metcalf). 
 16.  Id. at 933 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. Victor C. Rivers). 
 17.  Id. at 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins); see, e.g., WASH. 
CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing a detailed outline of how the initiative power 
functions in Washington state). 
 18.  2 PACC 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins). 
 19.  See id. at 931 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. Warren A. Taylor) (noting 
that even if the initiative is not frequently used, “it serves a useful purpose in this 
way that the legislature does know that the people have reserved to them the right 
to initiate legislation and the right to pass upon legislation that has been 
passed . . . so that ultimately they can, if they deem fit, can guide the legislature”). 
 20.  ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 11. 
 21.  2 PACC 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins). 
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General for certification of its constitutionality, subject to court review, 
prior to the circulation of petitions.”22 This proposed procedure was 
“intended to stop, at the initial stage, the circulation of petitions for laws 
that would, even if approved by the voters, result in expensive court 
action.”23 
The ballot initiative committee found some legislative power to be 
out of bounds. The Committee’s studies of other states showed that “in 
practically all the states that have the initiative . . . there are certain 
limitations placed upon the matters that can be acted upon by those 
measures.”24 The delegates debated and decided against unfettered use 
of the initiative, and created certain limitations intended to “prevent the 
abuses and problems that have sometimes arisen in the states permitting 
initiative and referendum.”25 Among the limitations included in the 
Constitution are ballot initiatives that purport to divest the legislature of 
its appropriations and spending power, which in “some instances” 
caused the “governmental functions and governmental institutions [to 
suffer] a great deal.”26 The initiative was also not to “be used with regard 
to emergency legislation, appropriations, or measures earmarking taxes 
and other revenues, or for special or local laws that are of interest to only 
one group of people or people only in one portion of the state.”27 Some 
sixty-five years later, history would show that it was the restrictions 
placed on the initiative—and not necessarily the initiative right itself—
that would generate the most dispute and jurisprudence.28 
B.  Today’s Initiative: Article XI and the Delegates’ Vision Realized 
The delegates’ assiduous study bore fruit. Today, Article XI of the 
Alaska Constitution is a carefully crafted set of rights, duties, and 
standards governing use of the initiative; one that honors the people’s 
fundamental right to direct legislation and yet reserves core powers to the 
legislature.29 The Alaska Constitution provides that “the people may 
 
 22.  Id. Ultimately, the Attorney General’s role in the ballot measure process 
did not become part of the Alaska Constitution; rather, it was codified in statute 
to a limited degree and expanded in practice to an even greater extent. See 
generally infra Part IV. 
 23.  2 PACC 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins). Of course, this 
standard led to lengthy debate among the delegates. See infra Part IV. 
 24.  2 PACC 931 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. Warren A. Taylor). 
 25.  Id. at 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 930. 
 28.  See infra Part III. 
 29.  See 2 PACC 932 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. Warren A. Taylor) 
(noting that the delegates’ approach reserves “the right of the people” to the 
initiative, but as “in practically all states that have the initiative . . . there are 
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propose and enact laws by the initiative.”30 The Alaska Constitution 
further dictates both an application and a petition phase of the initiative 
process: “An initiative is proposed by an application containing the bill to 
be initiated . . . signed by not less than one hundred qualified voters as 
sponsors,” filed with the lieutenant governor for certification, with denial 
of certification “subject to judicial review.”31 “After certification of the 
application, a petition containing a summary of the subject matter” must 
be “prepared by the lieutenant governor for circulation by the 
sponsors.”32 
Petition circulators must meet certain numerical and geographical 
thresholds for signature collection prior to filing—thresholds made 
somewhat more restrictive by a 2004 constitutional amendment.33 
 
certain limitations”). 
 30.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 31.  Id. § 2; see also ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.240 (2020) (permitting judicial review 
of certification decisions within 30 days of the date on which notice of the 
determination was given). The position of lieutenant governor of Alaska contains 
a somewhat unique set of responsibilities. The lieutenant governor must “have 
the same qualifications as the governor and serve for the same term. He shall 
perform such duties as may be prescribed by law and as may be delegated to him 
by the governor.” ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 7. Further, the Lieutenant Governor is 
required to “administer state election laws,” including those related to ballot 
initiatives. ALASKA STAT. § 44.19.020(1) (2020). 
 32.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
 33.  See GORDON HARRISON, ALASKA LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY, ALASKA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 183 (5th ed. 2012) (noting that the amendment 
requires signatures from “at least three-fourths” of house districts, instead of 
previously only two-thirds, and adding the requirement that in each of those 
districts signatures make up “at least seven percent of those who voted in the 
preceding general election in the house district”). Amendments to the Alaska 
Constitution are accomplished by a two-thirds vote of each house of the 
legislature and a majority of the voters at the next general election. ALASKA CONST. 
art. XIII, § 1. The amendment was described to Alaska voters on the 2004 general 
election ballot as follows: 
BALLOT MEASURE NO. 1. House Joint Resolution No. 5. Signatures 
for Initiative and Referendum Petitions: This amendment changes how 
to gather signatures for an initiative or referendum petition. It requires 
signatures from more of the voting districts in the State. It says that 
signers must be from at least 30 of the 40 house districts, three more than 
now required. It further requires signatures from each of 30 districts to 
be at least equal to seven percent of the voters who voted in each of these 
districts in the last general election. Currently only one signer from a 
district satisfies the requirement for district participation. The total 
number of statewide signatures required does not change. Should this 
constitutional amendment be adopted? 
Official Election Pamphlet, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS 87 (2004), 
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/oep/2004/2004oepreg1.pdf. Proponents 
of the amendment felt this distribution requirement would better reflect the 
voters’ will across the vast geography of the State by ensuring that “initiatives 
truly reflect the wishes and goals of more Alaskans and not just those of well-
funded outside interests.” Id. at 88. Opponents felt it would make direct 
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Specifically, before the sponsors file the petition with the lieutenant 
governor, it must bear the signatures of: 
[Q]ualified voters equal in number to at least ten percent of those 
who voted in the preceding general election, who are resident in 
at least three-fourths of the house districts of the State, and who, 
in each of those house districts, are equal in number to at least 
seven percent of those who voted in the preceding general 
election in the house district.34 
With respect to timing, “an initiative petition may be filed at any 
time.”35 The lieutenant governor is required to “prepare a ballot title and 
proposition summarizing the proposed law, and shall place them on the 
ballot for the first statewide election held more than one hundred twenty 
days after adjournment of the legislative session following the filing.”36 If, 
during that intervening session and before the election, “substantially the 
same measure has been enacted [by the legislature], the petition is void.”37 
If an initiative is approved by a majority of voters at an election, it 
becomes effective ninety days after the lieutenant governor certifies the 
election results.38 An initiated law “is not subject to veto, and may not be 
repealed by the legislature within two years of its effective date. It may be 
amended at any time.”39 
III. ARTICLE XI, SECTION 7: INITIATIVE RESTRICTIONS AND 
DEVELOPING CASELAW 
As discussed above, the delegates envisioned, and the constitution 
contains, significant restrictions on use of the initiative. The Alaska 
Constitution specifies that “[t]he initiative shall not be used to dedicate 
 
democracy more difficult to access and was a “drastic and unnecessary change.” 
Id. at 89. This is the only substantive amendment to the initiative process since the 
Alaska Constitution was adopted. See Constitutional Amendments Appearing on the 
Ballot in Alaska, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS (Dec. 28, 2016), 
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H28.pdf (listing the constitutional 
amendments that have appeared on the ballot in Alaska). It passed by a margin 
of 149,236 to 139,642, or approximately seven percent. Id. at 1. 
 34.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
 35.  Id. § 4. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id.; see also infra Part IV. 
 38.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6. Certification of election results is a formality 
that typically occurs several weeks after an election. See, e.g., Becky Bohrer, Alaska 
Officials Hope to Certify Primary Results by Tuesday, KTUU NEWS (Aug. 31, 2018, 8:10 
PM), https://www.ktuu.com/content/news/Alaska-officials-hope-to-certify-
primary-results-by-Tuesday-492220521.html (noting Alaskan officials hoped to 
certify primary results two weeks after the August 21, 2018 primary). 
 39.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6. 
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revenues, make or repeal appropriations, create courts, define the 
jurisdiction of courts or prescribe their rules, or enact local or special 
legislation.”40 The Court has held that these restrictions “are important 
conditions on the initiative right that require strict compliance.”41 As with 
most constitutional mandates, the meaning of these restrictions is distilled 
through practice. Much of Alaska’s caselaw on initiatives focuses on these 
enumerated restrictions, and, over the years, the Court has developed a 
long line of jurisprudence interpreting them.42 This Part explores how the 
Court has molded and shaped the parameters of these restrictions at both 
the state and local levels, from the early days of statehood to the present.43 
A.  Appropriations 
The making and repealing of appropriations by initiative is the most 
frequently litigated initiative restriction, in part because the Alaska 
Constitution does not define “appropriation.”44 In elaborating on the 
definition of “appropriation,” the Court consistently expanded the scope 
of public assets subject to appropriation beyond just money. Indeed, the 
first time the Court reviewed the appropriations restriction, it concluded 
that it was intended to embrace land as well as money.45 
In Thomas v. Bailey,46 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the 
“Alaska Homestead Act,” better known as “The Beirne Initiative.”47 The 
Beirne Initiative sought to make thirty million acres of state land available 
 
 40.  Id. § 7. 
 41.  Citizens Coal. for Tort Reform v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162, 168 n.14 (Alaska 
1991). 
 42.  See infra Part III. 
 43.  Like the State, local municipalities in Alaska have the power to enact laws 
by initiative. When the initiative is local, and not statewide, the power to enact it 
is statutory. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.26.100 (2020) (“The powers of initiative and 
referendum are reserved to the residents of municipalities, except the powers do 
not extend to matters restricted by art. XI sec. 7 of the state constitution.”); see also 
Griswold v. City of Homer, 186 P.3d 558, 563 (Alaska 2008) (stating “because the 
initiative was local, and not statewide, the power to initiate . . . was directly 
derived from AS 29.26.100, not article XI, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution”). 
The Municipal Clerk serves the same role as the Lieutenant Governor in this 
parallel process, see ALASKA STAT. § 29.26.110 (2020) (explaining role of municipal 
clerk in initiative process), and local enactments are subject to the same 
constitutional standards and restrictions as statewide enactments, see ALASKA 
STAT. § 29.26.100 (2020) (specifying powers of initiative and referendum “do not 
extend to matters restricted by” the Alaska Constitution). 
 44.  See Mallott v. Stand for Salmon, 431 P.3d 159, 164 (Alaska 2018) (“The 
Alaska Constitution does not provide any definition of the term 
‘appropriation’ . . . .”). 
 45.  See Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1979) (holding an initiative 
was an unconstitutional appropriation because it was “an expenditure of state 
assets in the form of public lands”). 
 46.  595 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1979). 
 47.  Id. at 2. 
 
2020  ALASKA’S BALLOT INITIATIVE TODAY 161 
to Alaska residents, parceled out based on citizens’ length of residency, 
subject to an application for the land grant and a nominal filing fee.48 The 
fundamental question the Court addressed in Bailey was whether the 
Beirne Initiative qualified as an unconstitutional appropriation.49 The 
Court detailed at great length the delegates’ adoption of the initiative 
restrictions in evaluating that key issue.50 The Court reasoned, “[i]n 
Alaska, land is a primary asset of the state treasury” and saw “no rational 
set of policy concerns that would prohibit an initiative from giving away 
$9,000,000,000 but would permit it to give away 30 million acres, valued 
at that sum.”51 Having decided that public land qualified as an asset of 
the state treasury, the Court went on to consider whether the initiative 
“appropriated” that asset.52 Ultimately, the Court held that the proposed 
land grant constituted an appropriation because it “[was] still an 
expenditure of state assets in the form of public lands,” and “would 
substantially deplete the state government of valuable assets just as surely 
as an initiative allotting to residents of specified years large sums of 
money.”53 Accordingly, the measure was considered “an appropriation” 
which therefore “[could] not be enacted by initiative.”54 
In expanding the definition of appropriation beyond monetary 
expenditures, Bailey set the stage for a series of decisions that would hone 
the parameters of the appropriations restriction. Since Bailey, the Court 
has decided that a number of non-monetary public assets are protected 
by the appropriations restriction. In Alaska Conservative Political Action 
Committee v. Municipality of Anchorage,55 the Court held that the restriction 
applied to both state and municipal assets and that an initiative that 
would require a municipality to transfer a major utility asset for the 
nominal sum of one dollar was an unconstitutional appropriation.56 In 
McAlpine v. University of Alaska,57 the Court held that an initiative that 
would require the transfer of real and personal property from the 
University to the Community College System was an unconstitutional 
appropriation by initiative because, although it was not a prohibited 
“give-away program” like the Beirne Initiative, it “committ[ed] certain 
 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See id. (stating first issue presented is whether “the initiative make[s] an 
appropriation, which is prohibited by the state constitution”). 
 50.  Id. at 4–8. 
 51.  Id. at 8. 
 52.  Id. at 8–9. 
 53.  Id. at 9. 
 54.  Id. 
 55. 745 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1987). 
 56.  Id. at 938. 
 57.  762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988). 
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public assets to a particular purpose.”58 In McAlpine the Court connected 
its definition of appropriation with the purpose of the restriction, 
determining that the transfer defeated a key purpose of the restriction: 
“[T]o ensure that the legislature, and only the legislature, retains control 
over the allocation of state assets among competing needs.”59 The Court 
emphasized the restriction’s purpose to preserve the legislature’s role in 
City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention & Visitors Bureau.60 There, the 
Court held that an initiative that would place bed tax revenues in a 
discretionary fund was not an unconstitutional appropriation because it 
did not “set aside a certain specified amount of money or property for a 
specific purpose or object in such a manner that is executable, mandatory, 
and reasonably definite with no further legislative action.”61 These cases 
and subsequent decisions affirm that initiative sponsors should be wary 
of initiatives that restrict the legislature’s flexibility in determining the 
fate of public assets. 
Alaska’s natural resources have become a flashpoint for ballot 
measure litigation, and in particular, appropriations arguments.62 In 
Pullen v. Ulmer,63 the Court held that an initiative which set priorities 
among different salmon harvest users was an unconstitutional 
appropriation because it appealed to certain user groups’ self-interests 
and significantly reduced the Board of Fisheries’ and the Legislature’s 
control over allocation decisions.64 In so holding, the Court first found as 
a threshold matter that salmon are public assets subject to appropriation 
under article XI, section 7.65 The Court reasoned that “naturally occurring 
salmon are, like other state natural resources, state assets belonging to the 
state which controls them for the benefit of all of its people.”66 Therefore, 
“the state’s interest in salmon migrating in state and inland waters is 
sufficiently strong to warrant characterizing such salmon as public assets 
 
 58.  Id. at 88. 
 59.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 60.  818 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1991). 
 61.  Id. at 1157. This test derives from McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 91. See also Pullen 
v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 63 n.13 (Alaska 1996) (applying McAlpine and rejecting a 
ballot measure distributing salmon to certain user groups as a violation of article 
XI, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution). 
 62.  In Brooks v. Wright, the Court upheld an initiative banning the use of 
snares to trap wolves, concluding that “the legislature does not have exclusive 
law-making powers over natural resources issues merely because of the state’s 
management role over wildlife set forth in Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution.” 
Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Alaska 1999). Accordingly, natural 
resources could be regulated by ballot measure. No party in Brooks argued that 
the measure was an appropriation, so the Court did not reach that question. Id. at 
1028 n.12. 
 63.  923 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1996). 
 64.  Id. at 63. 
 65.  Id. at 61. 
 66.  Id. 
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of the state which may not be appropriated by initiative.”67 Those assets 
were unconstitutionally appropriated under the initiative because the 
measure appealed to voters’ self-interests and constricted the legislature’s 
allocation authority.68 
The Court’s most recent decision on appropriations by initiative was 
Mallott v. Stand for Salmon,69 which centered on a ballot initiative that 
aimed to regulate large-scale mining projects in anadromous salmon 
habitat statewide. Stand for Salmon draws upon Pullen—and decades of 
appropriations decisions in natural resources and other state and local 
initiative cases that followed70—to clarify the current framework for 
analyzing the constitutional limitation on appropriations by initiative. 
One severable section of the Stand for Salmon measure violated the 
appropriations clause by barring the Commissioner of the Department of 
Fish and Game from issuing a permit to a project that would cause 
 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 63. 
 69.  431 P.3d 159 (Alaska 2018). 
 70.  See generally Lieutenant Governor v. Alaska Fisheries Conservation All., 
Inc., 363 P.3d 105, 106 (Alaska 2015) (rejecting “a proposed ballot initiative that 
would ban commercial set net fishing in nonsubsistence areas” because “set 
netters are a distinct commercial user group that deserves recognition in the 
context of the constitutional prohibition on appropriations” and because the 
measure “would completely appropriate salmon away from set netters and 
prohibit the legislature from allocating any salmon to that user group”); Hughes 
v. Treadwell, 341 P.3d 1121, 1131 (Alaska 2015) (upholding an initiative that 
would require legislative approval for certain mining projects “because the 
legislature would retain ultimate control over allocation of state assets”); All. of 
Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 273 P.3d 1128, 1137 
(Alaska 2012) (rejecting a ballot measure that would require voter approval for all 
capital projects with a cost over $1 million because it “sufficiently narrow[ed] the 
Borough’s ability to make allocation decisions”); Pebble Ltd. P’ship ex rel. Pebble 
Mines Corp. v. Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064, 1075 (Alaska 2009) (upholding an initiative 
that would regulate large-scale metallic mineral mining operations because it did 
not ”narrow[] the legislature’s range of freedom to make allocation decisions in a 
manner sufficient to render the initiative an appropriation”); Anchorage Citizens 
for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage, 151 P.3d 418, 420 (Alaska 2006) 
(upholding an initiative requiring the city to issue a taxi permit to any qualified 
person paying an administrative fee because taxicab permits were not public 
assets); Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage, 139 P.3d 1259, 1263 (Alaska 
2006) (rejecting an initiative that would permit the sale of municipal utilities for a 
nominal fee because it “control[led] the use of public assets such that the voters 
essentially usurp the legislature’s resource allocation role” and “by requiring the 
sale of public assets”); Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84 
P.3d 989, 993–95 (Alaska 2004) (rejecting an initiative setting aside and 
designating certain parkland because it “specified amounts of public assets in a 
way that encroaches on the legislative branch’s exclusive ‘control over the 
allocation of state assets among competing needs’” and because it “intrude[d] on 
decisions reserved by statute and constitution to the assembly” (quoting Pullen, 
923 P.2d at 62)). 
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substantial damage or have certain effects, “even if  in the 
Commissioner’s—or the legislature’s—considered judgment the public 
benefits of that particular project outweigh its effects on fish habitat.”71 In 
so doing, that section “‘encroache[d] on the legislative branch’s exclusive 
control over the allocation of state assets among competing needs by 
removing certain allocation decisions from the legislature’s range of 
discretion.”72 
The Court’s holding focused on the “two core objectives” underlying 
the prohibition against appropriations by initiative as the “foundation of 
[the Court’s] appropriation analysis.”73 Those two objectives are (1) “to 
prevent an electoral majority from bestowing state assets on itself” and 
(2) to “preserve to the legislature the power to make decisions concerning 
the allocation of state assets.”74 Stand for Salmon reiterated the ongoing 
importance of these two objectives to the caselaw, holding that “prior 
opinions repeatedly reaffirm the two core objectives by emphasizing the 
importance of preserving the legislature’s authority over allocation 
decisions,” although the test is applied “in different terms depending on 
the context.”75 While noting that the caselaw to some degree “obscure[s] 
and distract[s] from a focus”76 on these two core objectives, the Stand for 
Salmon Court nevertheless reaffirmed prior holdings that “an initiative 
effects an appropriation when it ‘would set aside a certain specified 
amount of money or property for a specific purpose or object in such a 
manner that is executable, mandatory, and reasonably definite with no 
further legislative action.’”77 
The restriction is also violated if “the initiative narrows the 
legislature’s range of freedom to make allocation decisions in a manner 
sufficient to render the initiative an appropriation.”78 Furthermore, “the 
line between an unobjectionable initiative that deals with a public asset 
and one that is an impermissible appropriation is crossed where an 
initiative controls the use of public assets such that the voters essentially 
usurp the legislature’s resource allocation role.”79 Stand for Salmon is 
useful because it summarizes and assimilates the Court’s prior caselaw 
on appropriations by initiative while rejecting dicta from prior opinions80 
 
 71.  Stand for Salmon, 431 P.3d at 167. 
 72.  Id. (quoting Alaska Action, 84 P.3d at 994). 
 73.  Id. at 165. 
 74.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. (quoting Alaska Action, 84 P.3d at 993). 
 78.  Id. (quoting All. of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kenai Peninsula 
Borough, 273 P.3d 1128, 1137 (Alaska 2012)).  
 79.  Id. (citing Hughes v. Treadwell, 341 P.3d 1121, 1128 (Alaska 2015)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 80.  Stand for Salmon explicitly rejected the unpersuasive reasoning and dicta 
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and re-centering the fulcrum of analysis on the two core objectives of the 
restriction. 
B.  Local or Special Legislation 
Article XI, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution prohibits initiatives 
that would constitute “local or special legislation.”81 Similar language 
elsewhere in the Constitution places this same restriction on the 
Legislature.82 As noted above, the Alaska Constitution specifically 
provides that the “law-making powers assigned to the legislature may be 
exercised by the people through the initiative, subject to the limitations of 
article XI.”83 Accordingly, the subject of an “initiative must constitute 
such legislation as the legislative body to which it is directed has the 
power to enact.”84 The Court has made clear that this means “[t]he 
people’s power to enact legislation by initiative is not greater than that of 
the legislature.”85 So it is clear that the Court views the methods of 
legislative and direct democracy as parallel powers with related 
restrictions and scope. 
The Court discussed both powers in Walters v. Cease,86 where ruling 
on an attempt to repeal a legislative act by referendum brought into focus 
the “local or special legislation” limitation as applied in both the 
legislative and initiative contexts. In Walters the Court rejected the 
attempted repeal by referendum of the Mandatory Borough Act, ruling 
that the act at issue was a local or special enactment by the legislature and 
therefore could not be repealed by initiative.87 The Court concluded that 
the Mandatory Borough Act was “not a general act” because “[i]t selected 
only a certain few communities which presumably met the standards for 
incorporation as organized boroughs and declared that they were to 
 
in Pebble. See id. at 167 (stating that the appropriations analysis in that case “[w]as 
[d]ictum [a]nd [i]s [n]either [b]inding [p]recedent [n]or [p]ersuasive”). 
 81.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
 82.  See Id. art. II, § 19 (“The legislature shall pass no local or special act if a 
general act can be made applicable.”). 
 83.  Id. art. XII, § 11. 
 84.  Municipality of Anchorage v. Frohne, 568 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1977). 
 85.  Alaskans for Legislative Reform v. State, 887 P.2d 960, 963 n.8 (Alaska 
1994), overruled on other grounds by Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 
896 (Alaska 2003). 
 86.  394 P.2d 670 (Alaska 1964). 
 87.  Id. at 671. The referendum is the mechanism for voters to approve or reject 
acts of the legislature. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1. Like the initiative, “[t]he 
referendum shall not be applied . . . to local or special legislation.” Id. § 7. 
Although Walters dealt with the referendum, it is analyzed in the same way as the 
initiative with respect to the local or special legislation restriction. 
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become incorporated,” but “made no mention of the rest of the state.”88 
Accordingly, the act could not be referred to the voters for repeal because 
it was “both local and special legislation within the meaning of article XI, 
section 7 of the constitution.”89 Specifically, it was “local because it 
applie[d] only to a limited number of geographical areas, rather than 
being widespread in its operation throughout the state” and “special 
because its method for incorporating organized boroughs [was] peculiar 
to the few selected localities” where it applied.90 
The Court’s “benchmark special legislation case”91 in the initiative 
context is Boucher v. Engstrom,92 which set down a standard for 
determining whether a proposed enactment qualifies as “local or 
special.”93 In Boucher, the Court reversed the trial court which held that a 
ballot measure proposing to relocate the state capital was local or special 
legislation because it excluded Anchorage and Fairbanks as possible new 
capital sites.94 The Court reasoned that “in deciding whether an initiative 
is local or special legislation, we must consider the subject matter of the 
initiative and determine whether the subject matter is of common interest 
to the whole state.”95 There, the Court held that “the location of Alaska’s 
capital has obvious statewide interest and impact” and cited Walters in 
stating that “a law does not cease to be general, and become local or 
special, because it operates only in certain subdivisions of the state.”96 
Additionally, “[l]egislation, whether enacted by the legislature or by the 
initiative, need not operate evenly on all parts of the state to avoid being 
classified as local or special.”97 
Boucher became a key standard in the only two subsequent cases 
where the Court has interpreted the “local or special” restriction. Both 
involved initiatives that in some way attempted to regulate mining 
activity in the Bristol Bay watershed—the site of a fierce, decades-long 
conflict between a proposed large-scale metallic sulfide mining operation 
and a highly productive sockeye salmon fishery.98 In Pebble Limited 
Partnership ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v. Parnell,99 the Court considered The 
 
 88.  Walters, 394 P.2d at 672. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Pebble Ltd. P’ship ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v. Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064, 
1078 (Alaska 2009). 
 92.  528 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1974), overruled on other grounds by McAlpine v. 
Univ. of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 84 (Alaska 1988). 
 93.  Id. at 461–64. 
 94.  Id. at 459, 464. 
 95.  Id. at 461. 
 96.  Id. at 461–62 (citing Walters v. Cease, 394 P.2d 670 (Alaska 1964)). 
 97.  Id. at 463. 
 98.  See, e.g., Lisa W. Drew, Prospect of a Mine Near a Salmon Fishery Stirs Worry 
in Alaska, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2005, at F4. 
 99.  215 P.3d 1064 (Alaska 2009). 
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Alaska Clean Water Initiative, a measure that proposed to limit the 
discharge of certain toxic pollutants on state lands and waters.100 The 
Court in Pebble framed the Boucher test as a two-part analysis in which the 
Court first makes “a threshold inquiry as to whether the proposed 
legislation is of general, statewide applicability” or rather is “of interest 
to only one group of people or people in only one portion of the state.”101 
If the Court determines that the initiative is of statewide application, the 
inquiry ends; otherwise, it moves to step two, in which the Court 
“determine[s] the relationship between the narrow focus of the proposed 
legislation and the purpose of the proposed legislation”102 by assessing 
“whether the legislation ‘bears a fair and substantial relationship to 
legitimate purposes.’”103 The Court “address[ed] ‘the reasonableness of 
the regulation or the classification of the subject matter,’” analogous to a 
rational basis standard of review.104 In Pebble, the Court upheld the 
initiative at issue because, although it would impact two specific mines—
Pebble and Donlin Creek—the Court determined that the initiative’s 
language was “sufficiently broad” that it would apply to other large scale 
metallic sulfide mining operations as well.105 Therefore, the proposed 
enactment applied statewide and the Court did not reach the second part 
of the test, although the Court did note that “it would pass muster” 
because of the statewide interest in water quality, fish and wildlife, and 
the fishing industry.106 
Six years later, in Hughes v. Treadwell,107 the Court again confronted 
a ballot measure focused on the Bristol Bay watershed. The purpose of 
“Bristol Bay Forever” “was to enact law ‘providing for [the] protection of 
Bristol Bay wild salmon and waters within or flowing into the existing 
1972 Bristol Bay Fisheries Reserve’” by requiring legislative approval 
before certain large-scale metallic sulfide mines could be built.108 The 
 
 100.  Id. at 1069. 
 101.  Id. at 1078 (quoting Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 461, 461 n.17)). 
 102.  Id. at 1078–79. 
 103.  Id. at 1079 (quoting State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 643 (Alaska 1977)). 
 104.  Id. (quoting Boucher, 528 P.2d at 461). See also Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 
430–31 (Alaska 1998) (holding that a statute modifying certain gas leases, though 
not of statewide application, was not local or special legislation because it was 
fairly and substantially related to legitimate state purposes). The rational basis 
test, applied to equal protection challenges, asks whether a particular legislative 
enactment is reasonable, not arbitrary, and “rest[s] upon some ground of 
difference having fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” 
McConkey v. Hart, 930 P.2d 402, 408 (Alaska 1996). 
 105. Pebble Limited P’ship ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp., 215 P.3d at 1080. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  341 P.3d 1121 (Alaska 2015). 
 108.  Id. at 1123–24 (quoting Ballot Measure 4: Alaska Bristol Bay Mining Ban 
(2012)). 
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Court considered, among other questions, whether the act was local or 
special legislation within the meaning of article XI, section 7, concluding 
that it was not.109 In this case, however, the parties agreed that the 
measure only applied to Bristol Bay, meaning it failed the threshold 
inquiry which required the Court to consider the second phase of the 
Boucher inquiry.110 The Court found “no serious question that requiring 
legislative approval of large-scale metallic sulfide mining operations in 
the Bristol Bay watershed bears a fair and substantial relationship to” the 
act’s stated purpose.111 The Court “conclude[d] that Bristol Bay’s unique 
and significant biological and economic characteristics are of great 
interest not just to the Bristol Bay region but to the state as a whole,” that 
the stated purpose to protect it was legitimate, and that the measure bore 
a fair and substantial relationship to that purpose.112 “The sponsors,” held 
the Court, “certainly could have proposed an initiative of statewide 
application, but instead they chose to focus on a very important fishery in 
a single region,” which was acceptable because “legislatures routinely 
must draw lines and create classifications.”113 As in the equal protection 
context, “a statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might 
have gone farther than it did” nor need it “strike at all evils at the same 
time” and it may make incremental reforms that “take one step at a time, 
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to 
the legislative mind.”114 In applying the Boucher test these cases make 
clear that ballot measures that do not have statewide application—but 
that invariably have statewide impact—are likely to survive the Boucher 
test as refined by Pebble and Hughes. 
C.  Dedicated Revenue 
Another constitutional restriction on initiatives prohibits dedicating 
revenue through direct democracy.115 As with local and special 
legislation, the prohibition against dedicating revenue by initiative has 
another constitutional parallel: the public finance provisions of the Alaska 
Constitution which provide that, with limited exception, “[t]he proceeds 
of any state tax or license shall not be dedicated to any special purpose.”116 
The Court has not often adjudicated initiative cases that presented a 
 
 109.  Id. at 1134. The Court also rejected an argument that the measure was an 
unconstitutional appropriation. Id. at 1131. 
 110.  Id. at 1131. 
 111.  Id. at 1132. 
 112.  Id. at 1133. 
 113.  Id. (quoting Pebble Ltd. P’ship ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v. Parnell, 215 
P.3d 1064, 1081 (Alaska 2009)). 
 114.  Id. at 1133–34 (quoting Pebble, 215 P.3d at 1081). 
 115.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
 116.  ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 7. 
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dedication of revenue problem, but when it has done so the Court has 
often relied on precedent from the legislative context. 
The Court directly considered the restriction of dedicating revenue 
in the initiative context for the first time in City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks 
Convention and Visitors Bureau.117 In that case a voter initiative sought to 
rearrange allocation of bed tax revenues collected from hotels and 
motels.118 The Court analogized the initiative process to more general 
legislative processes—in this case, the article XI, section 7 dedication 
question to the parallel prohibition in article IX, section 7—”[b]ecause the 
language of these two provisions is similar.”119 Accordingly, the Court 
“adopt[ed] a similar analysis of the meaning of each provision and the 
purposes behind them.”120 Relying on its precedent set in State v. Alex121 
from the legislative context, the Court in City of Fairbanks found that the 
bed tax was not a dedication of revenue because it did not create specific 
rights to funds for specific groups, earmark any funds for particular 
organizations, or create any mandatory expenditures.122 The purpose of 
the bed tax initiative was to “[fund] city facilities and services for the 
general public,” which was “so broad as to include any city 
expenditures.”123 
As with “the two core objectives” of the appropriations restriction, 
the Court examined “the two main motivations behind the ban on 
dedicated revenues,” which are “to maintain the potential of flexibility in 
budgeting and to ensure that the legislature did not abdicate 
responsibility for the budget.”124 Because the bed tax initiative did not 
“infringe on flexibility in the budget process,” and indeed enhanced that 
flexibility by removing existing restraints, the measure was not a 
prohibited dedication of revenue.125 City of Fairbanks remains the leading 
case on dedicated revenues by initiative. 
 
 117.  818 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1991). 
 118.  Id. at 1154–55. 
 119.  Id. at 1158. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  646 P.2d 203 (Alaska 1982) (holding unconstitutional a state statute that 
imposed a tax on the sale of salmon, the proceeds of which were to be mandatorily 
allocated to regional associations to enhance salmon production, leaving no 
legislative discretion to spend the revenues in any other way). Alex applied the 
parallel constitutional restriction on the legislative process from article IX, § 7 of 
the Alaska Constitution. 
 122.  City of Fairbanks, 818 P.2d at 1158. 
 123.  Id. (quoting the Interior Taxpayers Association’s proposed modifications 
to FAIRBANKS, ALASKA, GENERAL CODE ORDINANCE § 5.402(a) (1988)). 
 124.  Id. Of course, only the first of these two concerns applies to ballot 
initiatives. 
 125.  Id. at 1158–59. 
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D.  Creation of Courts, Jurisdiction of Courts, and Rules of Court 
Finally, article XI, section 7 also prohibits enacting initiatives that 
would “create courts, define the jurisdiction of courts or prescribe their 
rules.”126 The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted this restriction only 
once. In Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform v. McAlpine,127 the lieutenant 
governor declined to certify an initiative that would have set maximum 
allowable attorneys’ fees in personal injury cases, on the ground that the 
measure was an attempt to prescribe a rule of court in violation of article 
XI, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution.128 When the refusal to certify was 
challenged, the Court considered two inter-related issues: (1) “whether a 
limit on attorney contingent fees is necessarily classifiable as a rule of 
court” and, if so, (2) “whether article XI, section 7 of the constitution 
removes such a rule from the scope of the people’s power to legislate by 
initiative.”129 
The Court answered both questions in the affirmative.130 The Court 
cited its constitutional rule making power from article IV, section 1 of the 
Alaska Constitution,131 noting that one judicial power it has “exercised 
repeatedly is the power to regulate the practice of law in the state.”132 The 
Court found that the initiative’s contingent fee limit was inherently a 
court rule because it would “constrain any court’s analysis of whether a 
particular contingent fee was ‘reasonable’ or ‘clearly excessive’” under 
existing bar or disciplinary rules governing the conduct of attorneys.133 
The Court looked at caselaw from numerous other states with similar 
rules and was persuaded that “a limit on attorneys’ contingent fees is 
properly classifiable as a rule of court” because the Court, pursuant to its 
inherent powers, “might promulgate or reject a rule limiting contingent 
fees to maximum permissible amounts, just as other state courts have 
rejected or promulgated like rules pursuant to like authority.”134 
Having determined that the initiative could be classified as a court 
rule, the Court reviewed Constitutional Convention minutes in 
concluding that the initiative was prohibited by article XI, section 7 
because “rules regulating the practice of law often are equally as 
sophisticated, technical, or sensitive as rules governing the 
 
 126.   ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
 127.  810 P.2d 162 (Alaska 1991). 
 128.  Id. at 163–64. 
 129.  Id. at 164. 
 130.   Id. at 165, 168. 
 131.  Id. at 165 (“The court’s rule-making authority under this section is 
inherent in the judicial power vested in it, as the supreme court of the state.”). 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 166 (quoting ALASKA RULES OF BAR R. 35 and ALASKA RULES OF 
PROF’L. RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1991)). 
 134.  Id. at 167. 
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administration, practice, and procedure in the courts.”135 Accordingly, 
“the purpose of the restriction against prescribing court rules in article XI, 
section 7 logically extends to rules we may adopt under our 
[constitutional] power to regulate the practice of law and the conduct of 
attorneys in the state.”136 Creating courts or defining their jurisdiction are 
fairly straightforward prohibitions and therefore do not often come up in 
proposed initiatives. Any further disputes on this restriction are likely to 
be about the more complicated questions of court rules, like the one at 
issue in Citizens for Tort Reform. 
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF BALLOT INITIATIVES AND THE ROLE OF 
THE LEGISLATURE 
Beyond the article XI, section 7 initiative restrictions themselves, the 
caselaw and statutes contain numerous standards that guide the public 
and practitioners on four important guideposts: (1) the scope of the 
Court’s pre-election review of ballot measures; (2) the source and 
meaning of the “clearly unconstitutional under controlling authority” 
standard; (3) the single-subject rule; and (4) the role of the legislature in 
the initiative process. 
A.  Pre-Election Review 
Most initiative litigation occurs well before the measure reaches the 
ballot—in the pre-election phase, after the lieutenant governor has 
certified or denied certification, but before the election.137 As discussed in 
Part IV.D, the lieutenant governor—with the assistance of the Attorney 
General—has a gate-keeping role and reviews ballot measures for general 
compliance with article XI, section 7 and other technical requirements of 
application filing.138 Part of that review, of course, is determining whether 
the application meets the standards of pre-election review applied by the 
Alaska Supreme Court. 
The standard of review the Court applies to its own pre-election 
review of ballot measures is deferential to initiative sponsors.139 Except 
 
 135.  Id. at 170. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 139–166. 
 138.  See discussion infra Section IV.D. 
 139.  See, e.g., Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 899 (Alaska 
2003) (stating “[t]he Alaska Constitution expressly allows for expansive direct 
democracy through initiatives . . . .  Because the Alaska Constitution preserves the 
people’s power to propose and enact laws through initiatives, we have repeatedly 
held that courts must give statutory and constitutional regulations of initiatives 
liberal, broad readings.”). 
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with respect to the initiative restrictions discussed in Part III and two 
additional limitations discussed below, the Court gives a liberal 
construction to the people’s right to direct democracy.140 The Court has 
stated that “[i]n matters of initiative and referendum . . . the people are 
exercising a power reserved to them by the constitution and the laws of 
the state . . . and . . . the constitutional and statutory provisions under 
which they proceed should be liberally construed.”141 Accordingly, “all 
doubts as to technical deficiencies or failure to comply with the exact 
letter of procedure will be resolved in favor of the accomplishment of that 
purpose.”142 
State v. Trust the People143 is the leading case on the scope of pre-
election review for ballot measures. Shortly after then-Governor Frank 
Murkowski appointed his daughter, Lisa, to a vacant United States Senate 
seat, a group of initiative sponsors sought to repeal the statute allowing 
for such appointments and require them to be filled by special election 
instead.144 The State challenged the initiative, arguing that the proposal 
violated the Seventeenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
and therefore should not reach the ballot box.145 Siding with the initiative 
sponsors, the Court ruled for the sponsors over the State’s arguments that 
the proposal violated the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.146 The Court held that “pre-election judicial review may 
extend only to subject matter restrictions that arise from a provision of 
Alaska law that expressly addresses and restricts Alaska’s 
constitutionally established initiative process or to proposals that are 
clearly unlawful under controlling authority.”147 
In so holding, the Court observed that “a narrow interpretation of 
the permissible scope of pre-election review is faithful to our case law, is 
supported by the strong policies that generally disfavor advisory 
opinions, and is justified by the limited purpose of pre-election review—
to protect the Alaska Constitution’s express provisions defining the 
initiative process.”148 Because the subject matter of this initiative—filling 
senate vacancies—was not specifically barred from the initiative process 
under article XI, section 7, nor “clearly inapplicable” under article XII, 
section 11, nor was clearly resolved by controlling authority, “[i]ts 
ultimate compliance with the Seventeenth Amendment falls outside the 
 
 140.  See id. (noting that courts liberally construe initiative statutes because of 
the role initiatives play in maintaining direct democracy). 
 141.  Municipality of Anchorage v. Frohne, 568 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1977). 
 142.  Id. (quoting Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 462 (Alaska 1974)). 
 143.  113 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2005). 
 144.  Id. at 616. 
 145.  Id. at 617. 
 146.  Id. at 615. 
 147.  Id. at 624. 
 148.  Id. at 628. 
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proper scope of the lieutenant governor’s pre-election review.”149 The 
Court’s decision circumscribed the scope of the lieutenant governor’s pre-
election review and set down the “clearly unlawful” standard that later 
decisions would more clearly define.  
B.  “Clearly Unconstitutional Under Controlling Authority” 
After Trust the People, it was clear that the scope of pre-election 
review is narrow.150 Executive branch officials are not to undertake the 
role of judges and screen out ballot measures that simply raise general 
constitutional concerns or issues of first impression.151 The Court itself 
also will not entertain pre-election challenges to ballot measures—even 
constitutional challenges—that are not surgically targeted at the article XI, 
section 7 restrictions.152 As discussed in Part II, however, Alaska’s framers 
envisioned an initiative process that would not waste the voters’ or the 
courts’ time on expensive proposals that were clearly unlawful or would 
never pass muster,153 a vision that Trust the People acknowledged.154 
Developing a workable standard that balances these interests resulted in 
a handful of decisions telling us that the bar is low—essentially limiting 
pre-election review to weeding out the sorts of proposals that a 
reasonable lay person would construe as a waste of time. 
In Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney,155 the Court gave an example of 
the type of initiative that a municipal clerk156—in their capacity as a 
gatekeeper—could reject under this standard: “a clerk should reject an 
initiative mandating local school segregation based on race” in light of the 
United States Supreme Court’s desegregation decision in Brown v. Board 
 
 149.  Id. at 628–29. See also Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 
899–900 (Alaska 2003) (holding that a municipal clerk “should only reject an 
initiative petition that violates any of the liberally construed statutory or 
constitutional restrictions on initiatives or that proposes a substantive ordinance 
where controlling authority establishes its unconstitutionality” because “it is not 
the Clerk’s duty to reject every petition that may raise a constitutional issue . . . . 
To do so would effectively be a decision by the Clerk that a proposal is 
unconstitutional merely because no authority exists expressly declaring it 
unconstitutional;” furthermore, “[i]f this were permitted, every initiative raising 
an issue of first impression would be defeated before reaching the voters.”). 
 150.  See Trust the People, 113 P.3d at 628. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.   See id. at 624. 
 153.  See supra notes 21–23. 
 154.  Trust the People, 113 P.3d at 615. 
 155.  71 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2003). 
 156.  The municipal clerk acts in a parallel role to the lieutenant governor for 
review of local ballot initiatives and the same test is applied. See supra note 43. 
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of Education.157 Similarly, in Kohlhass v. State158 an initiative that called for 
Alaska’s secession from the United States was properly rejected because 
“the initiative [sought] a clearly unconstitutional end.”159 Specifically, 
“[e]ven though secession is not explicitly addressed in the United States 
or Alaska Constitutions, it is clearly unconstitutional” based on “a 
plentitude of [United States] Supreme Court cases holding as completely 
null the purported acts of secession” by Confederate states during the 
Civil War.160 Because “opinions of the [United States] Supreme Court 
interpreting the federal constitution . . . constitute controlling authority,” 
the measure was properly rejected.161 In Desjarlais v. State,162 the Court 
held that the lieutenant governor had properly rejected an initiative that 
would generally prohibit abortion, because the proposed initiative clearly 
contravened controlling United States Supreme Court caselaw in Roe v. 
Wade.163 The Court’s precedent dictates that a ballot measure is only 
properly rejected as “clearly unconstitutional” where “controlling 
authority leaves no room for argument” about its unconstitutionality.164 
From these cases we can glean that the Alaska Supreme Court means 
what it says: Only the most explicitly unconstitutional measures will be 
screened out of the certification process.165 Under the relevant caselaw, 
neither the lieutenant governor nor a municipal clerk may encroach on 
the role of the judiciary in entertaining possible constitutional infirmities 
and using their discretion to vet ballot measures on that basis.166 Given 
the Court’s restriction on its own pre-election review, disputed 
constitutional problems, to the extent they exist in an initiative bill, may 




 157.  Mahoney, 71 P.3d at901 n.22 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 
(1955)). 
 158.  147 P.3d 714 (Alaska 2006). 
 159.  Id. at 715. 
 160.  Id. at 719. 
 161.  Id. at 719–20. 
 162.  300 P.3d 900 (Alaska 2013). 
 163.  Id. at 904–05 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
 164.  Id. at 903 (quoting Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 
84 P.3d 989, 992 (Alaska 2004)). 
 165.  See id. (“A petition may be rejected as ‘clearly unconstitutional’ only ‘if 
controlling authority leaves no room for argument about its unconstitutionality.’” 
(citing Alaska Action, 84 P.3d at 992 (Alaska 2004))). 
 166.  See Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 900 (Alaska 2003) 
(“In both cases it is the courts, not the clerk or the executive, that are primarily 
responsible for constitutional adjudication.”). 
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C.  The Single-Subject Rule 
While the Alaska Constitution requires the legislature to confine bills 
to a single subject,167 there is no analogous provision in the constitution 
governing initiatives.168 However, state statute requires that an initiative 
bill similarly “be confined to one subject.”169 The Alaska Supreme Court 
has interpreted this statute to extend to the people enacting laws by 
initiative because article XI, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution sets “the 
law making power [of the legislature and initiative sponsors as] equal,” 
such that the constitutional single-subject rule imposed on the legislature 
applies equally to initiative bills.170 
This year, the Court clarified and reaffirmed this principle of equal 
footing between the legislature and the people acting by initiative.171 Until 
June of 2020, the two leading cases on the single-subject rule as applied to 
initiatives were Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v. McAlpine and Croft v. Parnell.172 
Initiative opponents in Yute Air challenged the measure at issue on single-
subject grounds, arguing that combining the regulation of state and local 
transportation with federal maritime law violated the single-subject 
principle.173 The Court rejected that argument, relying on prior single-
subject precedent in the context of legislative enactments to find that the 
measure’s provisions all sensibly related to eliminating “regulations and 
statutes thought to create needless transportation costs” under the 
broader umbrella subject of “transportation.”174 
Decades later, the sole issue in Croft was the single-subject 
compliance of a ballot measure that created a program to provide public 
campaign funding to candidates, proposed a three-cent tax per barrel on 
oil produced in Alaska, provided that the legislature could appropriate 
the tax to fund the program, and created a non-binding directive to 
transfer excess funds to the Permanent Fund Dividend.175 There, the 
Court found that the measure violated the single-subject rule.176 It 
reasoned that the rule “protects the voters’ ability to effectively exercise 
 
 167.  ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 13 (“Every bill shall be confined to one subject 
unless it is an appropriation bill or one codifying, revising, or rearranging existing 
laws.”). 
 168.  See Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v. McAlpine, 698 P.2d 1173, 1179 n.2 (Alaska 
1985) (noting that the state legislature subsequently enacted the single-subject 
requirement vis-à-vis initiatives). 
 169.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.040(1) (2020). 
 170.  Yute Air, 698 P.2d at 1179 n.2. 
 171.  Meyer v. Alaskans for Better Elections, 465 P.3d 477, 497 (Alaska 2020). 
 172. 236 P.3d 369 (Alaska 2010). 
 173.  Yute Air, 698 P.2d at 1175. 
 174.  Id. at 1182. 
 175.  Croft, 236 P.3d at 370–71. 
 176.  Id. at 370. 
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their right to vote by requiring that different proposals be voted on 
separately.”177 This “allows voters to express their will through their votes 
more precisely, prevents the adoption of policies through stealth or fraud, 
and prevents the passage of measures lacking popular support by means 
of log-rolling.”178 
The Court’s analysis began with a review of its standards for 
evaluating single-subject challenges.179 It stated that in ruling on such 
challenges, the Court “must balance the rule’s purpose against the need 
for efficiency in the legislative process,” since “[i]f the rule were applied 
too narrowly, statutes might be restricted unduly in scope and 
permissible subject matter.”180 The Court’s “solution has been to construe 
the single-subject ‘provision . . . with considerable breadth.’”181 Under 
that standard, “[a]ll that is necessary is that [the] act should embrace some 
one [sic] general subject” and “that all matters treated of should fall under 
some one general idea, be so connected with or related to each other, 
either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts of, or germane 
to, one general subject.”182  The Croft Court ultimately rejected the 
initiative at issue, holding that it “directly implicate[d] one of the main 
purposes of the single-subject rule—the prevention of log-rolling—in two 
ways.”183 First, the measure’s “coupling the approval of a new oil 
production tax with approval of a program to publicly fund elections 
deprive[d] the voters of an opportunity to send a clear message on each 
subject” of the initiative.184 Second, the non-binding directive to the 
legislature to transfer excess funds to the Permanent Fund Dividend was 
“entirely unrelated to the purpose of the clean elections program” and 
therefore “offering the chance of increased Permanent Fund Dividend 
payments runs the risk of garnering support for the clean elections 
program from voters who are otherwise indifferent—or even 
unsupportive—of publicly funded campaigns.”185 
On June 12, 2020, the Court removed any doubt that the single-
subject rule applies to initiatives with the same force and power as it does 
 
 177.  Id. at 372. 
 178.   Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Suber v. Alaska State Bond Comm., 
414 P.2d 546, 557 (Alaska 1966) (discussing protection against “stealth and 
fraud”)); Gellert v. State, 522 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Alaska 1974) (discussing protection 
against “log-rolling”). Log-rolling “consists of deliberately inserting in one bill 
several dissimilar or incongruous subjects in order to secure the necessary support 
for passage of the measure.” Short v. State, 600 P.2d 20, 23 (Alaska 1979). 
 179.  Croft, 236 P.3d at 372–73. 
 180.  Id. at 372 (internal quotation omitted) (citing Gellert, 522 P.2d at 1122). 
 181.  Id. at 372–73 (citing Gellert, 522 P.2d at 1122). 
 182.  Id. at 373 (quoting Gellert, 522 P.2d at 1123). 
 183.  Id. at 374. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
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to legislative enactments. In Meyer v. Alaskans for Better Elections,186 the 
lieutenant governor rejected, on single-subject grounds, a broad measure 
to enact statewide election reform by creating a non-partisan open 
primary, a ranked-choice general election, and mandating new 
disclosures in campaign finance law.187 The Court held that “[t]he 
initiative’s provisions substantively modify current election laws such 
that we can logically conclude they fall under the one subject of ‘election 
reform.’”188 In so holding, the Court rejected the State’s arguments that (1) 
the single-subject test should be stricter for initiative sponsors and (2) the 
Court should overturn prior caselaw to the extent it allowed for “even 
footing” between the legislature and initiative sponsors with respect to 
application of that test.189 The Court agreed with the initiative committee 
“that imposing a stricter one-subject standard to initiatives than to 
legislation would run counter to the delegates’ intent that the initiative 
serve as the people’s check on the legislature . . . when the legislature fails 
to pass laws the people believe are needed.”190 The Court concluded that 
“it now is up to the people to decide whether the initiative’s provisions 
should become law” when it comes before the voters in November 
2020.191 
D. The Legislature’s Role in Initiatives: Amendment, Repeal, and 
Substantially Similar Legislation 
As discussed in Part II, the framers of the Alaska Constitution sought 
to preserve certain legislative powers without allowing the legislature to 
undermine direct democracy.192 The Constitution thus prohibits the 
legislature from vetoing enacted initiatives or repealing them within two 
years, while still allowing post-enactment legislative amendments.193 
Additionally, substantially similar enactments by the legislature will void 
a measure before it reaches the ballot at “the first statewide election held 
more than one hundred twenty days after adjournment of the legislative 
session following the filing.”194 The process for amending an initiative is 
the same as for any other piece of legislation: after enactment, the 
legislature is permitted to amend the measure at any time as long as the 
 
 186.  465 P.3d 477 (Alaska 2020). 
 187.  Id. at 490–91. 
 188.  Id. at 498. 
 189.  Id. at 492. 
 190.  Id. at 493. 
 191.  Id. at 499. 
 192.  See supra Part II. 
 193.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6. 
 194.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 4. 
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amendments do not “so vitiate” the intent of the initiative as to constitute 
a repeal.195 But as discussed further below, an initiative may also be 
voided before it reaches the ballot if the legislature enacts “substantially 
similar” legislation before the election.196 
The Election Code echoes these constitutional parameters: if certified 
and properly filed, a ballot measure appears on the election ballot of the 
first statewide general, special, special runoff, or primary election that is 
held after a legislative session has convened and adjourned and a period 
of 120 days has passed since that adjournment.197 This serves the dual 
purpose of saving money on expensive special elections198 and giving 
both the legislature and the public the opportunity to carefully consider a 
measure before it goes to the ballot.199 As noted above, under the Alaska 
Constitution, “[i]f, before the election, substantially the same measure has 
been enacted, the petition is void.”200 Alaska Statutes section 15.45.210 
echoes this provision by requiring the lieutenant governor, “with the 
formal concurrence of the attorney general,” to determine if “an act of the 
legislature that is substantially the same” as the initiative was enacted 
between the petition filing and the election.201 If so, “the petition is void 
and the lieutenant governor shall so notify the committee.”202 
Warren v. Boucher203 is one of two leading cases on substantial 
similarity between initiative bills and subsequent legislative enactments. 
In Warren, the Court addressed for the first time “the process and 
conditions, if any, by which enactments of the legislature can operate to 
prevent an initiative from appearing on the ballot.”204 Warren involved 
two pieces of legislation—one by initiative and one subsequently enacted 
by the legislature—dealing with election campaigns and contributions.205 
After the attorney general and lieutenant governor concluded that the 
two measures were substantially similar, the lieutenant governor voided 
 
 195.  Warren v. Thomas, 568 P.2d 400, 402 (Alaska 1977). 
 196.  See infra notes 197–202 and accompanying text. 
 197.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.190 (2020). 
 198.  See Starr v. Hagglund, 374 P.2d 316, 322 (Alaska 1962) (noting that the 
Alaska Constitution’s drafters amended article XI, section 4 before adoption in 
order to reduce costs associated with the special elections that the original 
language would have required in some cases). 
 199.  The lieutenant governor must hold statewide public hearings at least 30 
days before the election at which a ballot measure is to appear. ALASKA STAT. § 
15.45.195(a) (2020). The legislature also must hold at least one hearing on a 
properly filed ballot measure within 30 days of convening the session preceding 
the statewide election at which the measure is set to appear. Id. § 24.05.186 (2020). 
 200.  ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 4. 
 201.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.210 (2020). 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  543 P.2d 731(Alaska 1975). 
 204.  Id. at 732. 
 205.  Id. 
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the initiative petition and the initiative sponsors sued.206 
The Warren initiative was entitled “[a]n Act relating to campaign 
contributions, expenditures, and their limitations” and the legislative act 
was entitled “[a]n Act relating to the election campaigns; and providing 
for an effective date.”207 In agreeing with the State that the measure and 
legislation were indeed substantially similar, and that therefore the 
lieutenant governor was correct to void the petition, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that legislative enactment “treat[ed] 
the same problem as that sought to be reached by the proposed initiative” 
and that both “attempt[ed] to reach the same results, more effective 
election campaigns.”208 The Court also clarified that substantial similarity 
analysis is fact-sensitive, stating “[t]he words ‘substantial’ or 
‘substantially’ are relative, inexact terms. Their meaning is quite 
elusive . . . [and] [t]he meaning of such terms can be derived only be [sic] 
reference to all the circumstances surrounding the context in which they 
are used.”209 Recognizing that the framers did not want an unrestricted 
initiative process, the Court reasoned, “[T]he term ‘substantially the same 
measure’ must be viewed against the total structure contemplated in Art. 
XI of our constitution in the matter of direct legislation.”210 
The Court looked to the Constitutional Convention, concluding that 
“the legislative act need not conform to the initiative in all respects, and 
that the framers intended that the legislature should have some discretion 
in deciding how far the legislative act should differ from the provisions 
of the initiative.”211 With respect to how far the legislative act could go 
before it was no longer substantially the same, the Court concluded that 
the legislature’s discretion was “reasonably broad,” and that “[i]f in the 
main the legislative act achieves the same general purpose as the 
initiative” and “accomplishes that purpose by means or systems which 
are fairly comparable” they are considered substantially similar.212 The 
Court elaborated that “[i]t is not necessary that the two measures 
correspond in minor particulars, or even as to all major features, if the 
subject matter is necessarily complex or if it requires comprehensive 
treatment.”213 And it held that “[t]he broader the reach of the subject 
matter, the more latitude must be allowed the legislature to vary from the 
 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. at 734–35. 
 209.  Id. at 736 (internal citation omitted) (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Ry. Co. v. Kings Cty. Water Dist., 302 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1956)). 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. 
180 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:2  
particular features of the initiative.”214 Recently, the lieutenant governor 
and attorney general relied on Warren to void an initiative petition 
relating broadly to campaign finance, public official integrity, and good 
governance after the legislature passed substantially the same measure.215 
That decision was not challenged in court.216 
The second main case on substantial similarity, decided some thirty 
years after Warren, is State v. Trust the People,217 which, as discussed above, 
also focuses on the scope of pre-election review of ballot measures.218 
Trust the People also contains important language regarding the scope of 
the legislature’s authority to amend ballot measures post-enactment.219 
Trust the People centered on a ballot initiative “restricting the governor’s 
power to temporarily appoint a United States Senator.”220 The Court 
reversed the lieutenant governor’s decision to void the petition based on 
a subsequent act of the legislature, concluding “that the principal purpose 
of the initiative is to completely remove from the governor all power to 
make temporary appointments to the office of United States senator, 
while the effect of the legislation is to preserve in all cases the governor’s 
power to make temporary appointments to that office.”221 
In drawing their conclusion, the Court explicitly rejected the State’s 
argument that the legislature’s power to amend an initiative post-
enactment was tantamount to its power to supplant the measure entirely 
with substantially the same measure.222 Although the Court’s prior 
caselaw “recognized that the legislature is vested with broad authority to 
amend laws enacted by the people through the initiative process”223 and 
its prior dicta could be “read to equate the two powers, they are not 
equal.”224 The framers of the Constitution intended to give the legislature 
 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  17AKGA & HB 44 Substantial Similarity Analysis, 2018 Op. Alaska Att’y 
Gen. No. JU2017200579 (May 25, 2018). 
 216.  See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.240 (2020) (allowing persons aggrieved by any 
determination made by the lieutenant governor under Alaska Statutes 15.45.010–
220 to seek judicial review within 30 days of receiving notice of the 
determination). 
 217.  113 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2005). 
 218.  See supra Section III.A. 
 219.  Trust the People, 113 P.3d at 623. 
 220.  Id. at 614. 
 221.  Id. at 615. 
 222.  Id. at 623 (“[T]he power to avoid an initiative by enacting legislation 
should not be equated with the power to amend an initiative enacted by the 
voters.”). It is worth noting that if an initiative petition is voiced by substantially 
similar legislation, that legislation is not subject to the same two-year restriction 
on repeal that an initiated version of the same bill would enjoy. 
 223.  Warren v. Thomas, 568 P.2d 400, 402 (Alaska 1977) (citing Warren v. 
Boucher, 543 P.2d 731, 737 (Alaska 1975)). 
 224.  Trust the People, 113 P.3d at 623 (discussing Warren v. Boucher, 543 P.2d 
731 (Alaska 1975)). 
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“only the power to amend and not the power to destroy”225 a ballot 
measure, and therefore, “even amendments to popularly-initiated 
legislation must still ‘effectuate[] the intent of the electorate,’ and an 
amendment that ‘so vitiates an act passed by initiative as to constitute its 
repeal’ is not acceptable.”226 
Accordingly, the “essential inquiry” with respect to the scope of the 
legislature’s power to amend an initiative will be whether a given 
legislative enactment “so vitiates” an initiative as to constitute its 
repeal.227 Read together, the cases on this topic show that legislative 
amendments to initiated legislation must be manifestly loyal to the intent 
of the bill—and by inference that of the voters—who enacted it. 
V. STATUTORY COMPLIANCE FOR BALLOT INITIATIVE SPONSORS 
As discussed above, much of the constitutional process for ballot 
initiatives is delineated in Article XI and associated caselaw.228 The 
Constitution explicitly provides, however, that “additional procedures 
for the initiative . . . may be prescribed by law.”229 The Alaska Election 
Code230 elaborates on and implements the constitutional requirements of 
sponsoring and enacting ballot initiatives.231 It is most useful for 
practitioners to think of the process in three distinct phases: application 
and certification; petition and signature gathering; and election and 
enactment. 
A.  The Application and Certification Phase 
An initiative begins with an application and, of course, a proposed 
bill. Article XI, section 2 of the Alaska Constitution provides: 
An initiative . . . is proposed by an application containing the bill 
to be initiated . . . . The application shall be signed by not less 
than one hundred qualified voters as sponsors, and shall be filed 
with the lieutenant governor. If he finds it in proper form he 
shall so certify. Denial of certification shall be subject to judicial 
 
 225.  Id. (quoting Boucher, 543 P.2d at 740 (Erwin, J., dissenting)). 
 226.  Id. (internal citation omitted) (first quoting Thomas, 568 P.2d at 403, and 
then quoting Boucher, 543 P.2d at 737). 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  See supra Part III. 
 229.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6. 
 230.  ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.05.010–15.80.020 (2020). 
 231.  See generally id. §§ 15.45.010–245 (setting forth all procedures related to the 
initiative process). 
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review.232 
Alaska Statute section 15.45.030 requires the application to include: 
(1) The proposed initiative bill; (2) the printed name, signature, address, 
and numerical identifier of “not fewer than 100 qualified voters who will 
serve as sponsors;”233 and (3) a designated initiative committee of three 
sponsors who will represent the petitioners.234 Alaska Statute section 
15.45.040 further requires an initiative bill to meet four requirements: (1) 
the bill must be confined to one subject; (2) the subject of the bill must be 
expressed in the title; (3) the bill must contain a specific enacting clause—
”Be it enacted by the People of the State of Alaska;” and (4) the bill cannot 
contain subjects restricted by Alaska Statutes section 15.45.010 (the 
statutory equivalent of the Constitution’s Article IX, section 7 
restrictions).235 Because these requirements may be daunting to the 
general public, the Alaska Division of Elections offers forms and 
information for ballot measure applicants as well as a bank of prior 
Attorney General Opinions, timelines, and the status of past and current 
ballot measures.236 
Once the sponsors file their application, the lieutenant governor has 
sixty calendar days to review it and “either certify it or notify the initiative 
committee of the grounds for denial.”237 Although there is no statutory or 
constitutional requirement for the practice, the lieutenant governor 
typically seeks published advice from the Attorney General about 
whether to certify a ballot measure.238 Certification may be denied only 
 
 232.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
 233.  See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.030(2) (2020) (noting that the statute requires 
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measure on single subject grounds); 2019 Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. (Sept. 26), 
http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/opinions/opinions_2019/19-
004_2019200644.pdf (recommending certification of a ballot measure creating an 
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for three reasons: (1) the proposed bill “is not confined to one subject or 
is otherwise not in the required form;” (2) “the application is not 
substantially in the required form;” or (3) “there is an insufficient number 
of qualified sponsors.”239 Once the lieutenant governor issues his decision 
regarding certification, “any person aggrieved” by that decision has thirty 
days to challenge it in superior court.240 The certification process is the 
first major hurdle for sponsors and, as discussed in Parts III and IV, it is 
where most initiative-based litigation occurs.241 
B. The Petition and Signature Gathering Phase 
If initiative sponsors make a proper application and clear the first 
major hurdle of certification, they move to the petition phase. While less 
legally complex than certification, the petition phase can still bring 
litigation and be a time-consuming and expensive stage of the process. 
Article XI, section 3 of the Alaska Constitution provides: 
After certification of the application, a petition containing a 
summary of the subject matter shall be prepared by the 
lieutenant governor for circulation by the sponsors. If signed by 
qualified voters who are equal in number to at least ten percent 
of those who voted in the preceding general election, who are 
resident in at least three-fourths of the house districts of the 
State, and who, in each of those house districts, are equal in 
number to at least seven percent of those who voted in the 
preceding general election in the house district, it may be filed 
with the lieutenant governor.242 
The Court has held that “nothing in the constitution says or implies 
that the [signature] verification process tolls the time in which the 
initiative is to be considered by the legislature and proceeds onto the 
 
educational bill of rights for Alaska students). 
 239.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.080 (2020); see also 2017 Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. (Oct. 
6), 
http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/opinions/opinions_2017/17003_JU201720057
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the “required form” of an initiative bill and checks the application for compliance 
with the technical requirements of the statute). 
 240.  See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.240 (2020) (permitting judicial review of any 
decision made by the lieutenant governor under § 15.45.010–220). 
 241.  See supra Part III and Part IV. 
 242.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 3; see also ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.140(a) (2020) 
(describing the requirements for the petition to the Alaska Lieutenant Governor); 
supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting the signature distribution 
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ballot (or is voided by legislative enactment of substantially the same 
measure).”243 Further, “‘the signature-gathering requirement . . . serves 
an important screening purpose’; it ‘ensures that only propositions with 
significant public support are included on the ballot.’”244 This means that 
once the requisite number of signatures is obtained and the petition is 
filed, the time for the legislature to act to void the initiative begins to run. 
The lieutenant governor’s office must verify the signatures on the filed 
petition, but verification occurs while the legislative clock is running. 
Alaska Statute 15.45.090(a) requires the lieutenant governor to 
“prepare a sufficient number of sequentially numbered petitions to allow 
full circulation throughout the state.”245 Each petition booklet must have 
seven items: (1) a copy of the proposed bill; (2) an impartial summary of 
the subject of the bill; (3) a statement of the minimum costs to the state 
associated with certifying the measure (excluding legal costs); (4) a cost 
estimate for the state’s implementation of the proposed law; (5) a 
statement of warning to signers of the criminal penalties for fraudulent 
signing; (6) sufficient space for the printed name, signature, numerical 
identifier, and address of each signer; and (7) other specifications the 
lieutenant governor may require to ensure proper handling and control 
of petition booklets.246 
The lieutenant governor is required to prepare a ballot title and 
proposition, with the assistance of the attorney general.247 In practice, the 
language for the ballot measure is typically included in the Attorney 
General’s opinion recommending certification.248 Generally, this 
language is similar if not identical to the language that subsequently 
appears in the petition booklets and on the ballot itself.249 That is because 
the Court has stated that if “the summary is deficient for the purposes of 
the petition [it is also] deficient for the purposes of the ballot.”250 The 
ballot title must “indicate the general subject of the proposition” in no 
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more than twenty-five words, and the proposition “shall give a true and 
impartial summary of the proposed law.”251 The summary has a word 
limit of 50 words per section of the bill and must meet certain readability 
requirements.252 The proposition must be worded on the ballot so that a 
“yes” vote is a vote to enact the proposed law.253 
Over the years, there has been some litigation on the second and 
fourth statutory requirements of the petition: the sufficiency of the ballot 
measure summary254 and the statement of costs to the State for 
implementing the initiative.255 Litigants have had mixed success 
overturning a summary or cost statement,256 and doing so is no easy task. 
The Court has explained that “the basic purpose of the ballot summary is 
to enable voters to reach an informed and intelligent decision on how to 
cast their ballots.”257 A ballot summary should “be ‘complete enough to 
convey an intelligible idea of the scope and import of the proposed law 
and . . . ought to be free from any misleading tendency, whether of 
amplification, of omission, or of fallacy.’”258 It “need not recite every detail 
of the proposed measure”259 but if certain information would give voters 
“‘serious grounds for reflection’ it is not a mere detail, and it must be 
disclosed.”260 
Still, the Court applies “a deferential standard of review for 
challenges to the adequacy of a petition summary” and will uphold the 
summary unless it “cannot reasonably conclude that it is impartial and 
 
 251.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.180(a) (2020). 
 252.  Id. § 15.45.180(b). 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Alaskans for Efficient Gov’t, Inc. v. State, 52 P.3d 732 (Alaska 2002). 
 255.   Pebble Ltd. P’ship ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v. Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064 
(Alaska 2009). 
 256.  Compare id. at 1085 (upholding a cost statement that “provide[d] an 
accurate estimate of the likely insignificant costs” of implementing an initiative 
regulating discharge of toxic pollutants into state lands and waters), and id. at 1084 
(holding the summary for an initiative regulating discharge of toxic pollutants 
into state land and waters “was a fair, true, neutral, and impartial explanation of 
the main features of the initiative’s contents”) (internal quotations omitted), and 
Burgess v. Miller, 654 P.2d 273, 276 (Alaska 1982) (upholding a ballot measure 
summary regarding fish and game usage because it was “neither misleading nor 
inaccurate”), with Planned Parenthood of Alaska v. Campbell, 232 P.3d 725, 730 
(Alaska 2010) (holding defective a ballot summary that failed to disclose criminal 
penalties for doctors performing abortions under certain conditions), and Alaskans 
for Efficient Gov’t, Inc., 52 P.3d at 735–36 (rejecting a ballot measure summary that 
“failed to adequately describe the actual changes” intended by a ballot measure 
to relocate the capital and “cast[]” the initiative’s purpose in an unnecessarily 
negative light”). 
 257.  Alaskans for Efficient Gov’t, Inc., 52 P.3d at 735–36. 
 258.  Id. at 734 (quoting Burgess, 654 P.2d at 275). 
 259.   Id. at 736. 
 260.  Id. (quoting Gaines v. McCuen, 758 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Ark. 1988)). 
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accurate.”261 The party challenging the summary “bear[s] the burden to 
demonstrate that it is biased or misleading.”262 
Similarly, the cost statement is given broad latitude. The statute 
“merely requires an ‘estimate’ of the cost of implementing the proposed 
law” and therefore “need not document every conceivable cost associated 
with” its implementation.263 The Court will defer to State agency expertise 
and uphold the State’s “reasonable conclusions” as to the costs of a ballot 
measure’s fiscal impact on the State.264 
Throughout any litigation surrounding the petition booklets, 
circulators are gathering signatures to place the measure on the ballot. 
Petition circulators are bound by three main statutory requirements: they 
must (1) be United States citizens, (2) be 18 years of age or older, and (3) 
be Alaska residents.265 Petition booklets must be circulated in person, and 
there is a one-dollar-per-signature limit on payment to circulators, subject 
to criminal penalties for violations.266 Under some circumstances, ballot 
summaries found defective may be cured without having to gather new 
signatures,267 but petitions may not be supplemented to compensate for 
deficient signatures after the verification process.268 Sponsors have one 
year to gather signatures from the date the lieutenant governor notified 
them that booklets were ready for delivery.269 To meet the constitutional 
and statutory signature thresholds and distribution requirements, 
sponsors may obtain from the lieutenant governor the number of persons 
who voted in the preceding general election.270 The lieutenant governor 
typically provides this data in his letter certifying the application, 
 
 261.  Pebble Ltd. P’ship ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. , 215 P.3d at 1073 (citing Alaskans 
for Efficient Gov’t, Inc., 52 P.3d at 735 (internal quotations omitted)). 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Id. at 1085. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.105 (2020); see also Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028 
(9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1104 (2009) (striking down a similar state 
resident circulator requirement on First Amendment grounds). 
 266.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.110 (2020). 
 267.  See Planned Parenthood of Alaska v. Campbell, 232 P.3d 725, 734 (Alaska 
2010) (holding that a defective summary did not require new signature gathering 
after considering, on balance, “the nature and magnitude of the misleading 
statement or omission, the likelihood and extent of petition-signer inadvertence, 
the hardship to initiative sponsors that invalidating signatures would cause, and 
the hardship to the initiative’s opponents that permitting the initiative to go 
forward would cause”). 
 268.  See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.170 (2020) (repealing § 7, 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws 
ch. 80 and allowing sponsors to submit a supplementary petition); see also Letter 
from Kevin Meyer, Lieutenant Governor of Alaska, to Robin O. Brena (Oct. 15, 
2019), http://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/19OGTX/19OGTX%20-
%20Sponsor%20Application%20letter.pdf (certifying that the total number of 
gathered signatures is greater than the minimum required). 
 269.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.140 (2020). 
 270.  Id. § 15.45.090(b). 
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informing sponsors of the total number of signatures they must gather 
from the requisite House districts.271 
After gathering all requisite signatures, the sponsors file their 
petition booklets with the lieutenant governor, who has 60 days to review 
them and determine whether the petition was properly or improperly 
filed.272 Unlike the certification process, which involves legal analysis, the 
basis for determining that the petition was improperly filed is ministerial–
–the petition simply must contain sufficient valid signatures that meet the 
constitutional and statutory distribution requirements.273 
C. The Election and Enactment Phase 
After clearing application, certification, circulation, signature-
gathering, and petition-filing, initiative sponsors have one final hurdle 
before they can present their measure to the voters for enactment: As 
discussed in Part III, they must wait out a legislative session, giving the 
legislature the opportunity to enact substantially the same measure, 
which would void the petition.274 With respect to initiative elections, 
Article XI, section 4 of the Alaska Constitution provides: 
An initiative petition may be filed at any time. The lieutenant 
governor shall prepare a ballot title and proposition 
summarizing the proposed law, and shall place them on the 
ballot for the first statewide election held more than one 
hundred twenty days after adjournment of the legislative 
session following the filing. If, before the election, substantially 
the same measure has been enacted, the petition is void.275 
Although the petition may be filed at any time, sponsors only have 
one year to file the petition booklets from the time the lieutenant governor 
 
 271.  See, e.g., Letter from Kevin Meyer, Lieutenant Governor of Alaska, to 
Robin O. Brena, supra note 268 (certifying that the signatures submitted were 
those of qualified voters and informing the sponsors that the number of required 
signatures is 28,501). 
 272.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.150 (2020). 
 273.  Id. § 15.45.160 (2020); see, e.g., Letter from Byron Mallott, Lieutenant 
Governor of Alaska, to Joseph Connors (Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/13PCAF/13PCAF-Notice-of-
Proper-Filing.pdf (documenting the Lieutenant Governor’s verification of 
signatures in a notice); Final Report of Weekly District Totals for 13PCAF, ALASKA 
DIV. OF ELECTIONS (July 28, 2015), 
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/13PCAF/13PCAF-District-Totals-
Report.pdf (noting the number of required signatures per House district and the 
number of obtained signatures per district). 
 274.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 4. 
 275.  Id. 
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notified the committee that they were ready for delivery.276 The timing 
can be tricky––sponsors often try to file their petition booklets shortly 
before the legislative session convenes so that they can maximize their 
time to collect signatures in time to get the measure on the next statewide 
election ballot,277 rather than filing at the end of session and having to wait 
an additional year for another legislative session to convene and adjourn 
before the proposition can appear on the ballot.278 
If and after a full legislative session has passed without the 
legislature enacting substantially the same measure, voters have their 
chance to cast a ballot on the initiative. Article XI, section 6 of the Alaska 
Constitution provides in relevant part: 
If a majority of the votes cast on the proposition favor its 
adoption, the initiated measure is enacted . . . . The lieutenant 
governor shall certify the election returns. An initiated law 
becomes effective ninety days after certification, is not subject to 
veto, and may not be repealed by the legislature within two 
years of its effective date. It may be amended at any time.279 
Of the fifty-four ballot measures that have appeared on the ballot in 
the sixty-one years since statehood, twenty-six have been voted down and 
twenty-eight have been enacted.280 Starting in about 1974, at least one—
and, in 1998, five—ballot initiatives appeared on a statewide election 
ballot during each election cycle.281 The frequency of use is a good 
indicator that Alaska’s initiative process is accessible enough to allow for 
the people’s fundamental right to direct democracy, and is constrained by 
enough restrictions and safeguards to avoid overpopulating the ballot or 
usurping the legislative process. 
 
 
 276.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.140 (2020). 
 277.  See id. § 15.25.020 (2020) (noting that Alaska’s statewide primary election 
occurs on the third Tuesday in August of even-numbered years); see also Initiative 
Petition List, ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS, 
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/Core/initiativepetitionlist.php#13psum 
(demonstrating the recent trend of ballot measures appearing on the general 
election ballot in November as opposed to the primary election in August). 
 278.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.140 (2020) (noting how an initiative petition 
may be filed at any time, but the sponsors only have exactly one year to file the 
petition booklets from the time the lieutenant governor notified the committee 
that they were ready for delivery or the petition will have no effect). 
 279.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6. 
 280.  Initiative History, ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS (June 24, 2019), 
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H26.pdf#page=1. 
 281.  Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Alaska’s ballot measure process strikes a careful balance between 
accessibility and restriction. The framers of the Alaska Constitution 
believed that direct democracy was a fundamental right of the people.282 
However, they also wanted to ensure that the people’s exercise of this 
right did not encroach on the roles of the legislature or the judiciary, or 
waste the State’s time or money on clearly unlawful measures.283 
Almost every election cycle in Alaska brings new ballot 
propositions. Recent and significant public policy changes—such as the 
legalization of recreational marijuana284 and raising the minimum 
wage285—might not have occurred but for the ballot initiative. Although 
the initiative process from application to enactment is doubtlessly 
tedious, costly, and burdensome for sponsors and for the State, care and 
determination in engaging with that process have shown that direct 
democracy can be an effective means of enacting legislation in Alaska. 
 
 
 282.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI. 
 283.  Id. § 6. 
 284.  ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.010–900 (2020); see, e.g., Jason Brandeis, Ravin 
Revisited: Alaska’s Historic Common Law Marijuana Rule at the Dawn of Legalization, 
32 ALASKA L. REV. 309 (2015) (providing further historical context on Alaska’s 
complex history of marijuana regulation). 
 285.  ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.065 (2020). 
